Constitution : A Feudal and Federal Europe? - 30.12.2003

 FAilure of the European Summit of December 12 & 13 2003
      

The failure of the Intergouvernemental Conference (IGC) of 12 and 13 December to agree on the institutional questions of the European Constitution marks the end of the intergovernmental approach to European integration. This failure follows similar outcomes of IGC for over 10 years and demonstrates that Europe is unable to adapt to a changing environment. For all European citizens, but especially for the members of the Convention who gave their precious time to elaborate the draft Constitution, this failure leaves them with the feeling that national authorities treat them like barons would their serves in the Middle-Ages. The Constitutional project ambitioned to give Europe a set of institutions capable of carrying it into the 21st century. The Constitutional Treaty needs to be submitted to the vote of all European citizens in order for them to regain their full sovereignty.

Feudal Europe.
Those who find this comparison exagerated, should remember   the  successive failures of the IGCs for over 10 years. Also, 50 years of co-operation in the European Economic Community have been inadequate to agree within the Convention on a reinforced economic governance to parallel the federal monetary governance within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). And, without a common economic governance, a social Europe cannot be implemented although it is called for by many citizens. The way the Ministers of Economy and Finance decided among themselves to suspend the application of the Growth and Stability Pact, approved by the democratic bodies in each country, is also indicative. This took place despite the good will of some Ministers (see under Articles the exchange of letters between Promeuro and the Belgian Minister Didier Reynders), thus demonstrating that it is indeed the intergovernmental decision taking process which is at stake. It took 30 years of bickering within the European Council to approve a decafeinated  status of the European company. The recent European directive of public mergers includes an optional clause regarding an essential feature providing a better protection of small shareholders in order to overcome the blockage imposed by unanimity voting.

The Belgian consumers' union (Test-Achats) concludes its review of the collapse of the IGC in December as follows : After the dissension around the war in Irak and the Pact, the subjects of friction among Member States of the Union keep on growing (Promeuro's comment : just like middle-aged barons found their legitimacy in quarrelling). . If these quarrels do not threaten the future of the Union (Promeuro's comment : which remains to be seen) , they do tarnish its international image and delay implementation of several projects. Economic performance (Promeuro's comment : hence the European citizens) will also suffer in due time.

And what about the costs of entertaining our barons' courts? Europeans pay today for 15 - and soon 25 - public administrations with their separate postal, military or transport services.  No wonder that public expenditures within the EU represent 45% of GDP, of which only 1 to 1.27% of GDP for the European Institutions. American citizens devote only 33.8% and Japanese 30.6%  of their GDP for public services. This is not just the consequence of less protective social services. Grouping national administrations would not only provide European citizens with more efficient services but also reduce their cost through economies of scale. This would liberate public funding for better social protection and for more equitable pension schemes considering the aging population.

Finally, our barons boost their image in international meeting where they participate in eloquence jousts applauded by their national electorate but which have little effect on international decisions. No wonder that under these conditions, the European economy scene, European citizens are deprived of any sovereignty in so far that they have no power to decide their own future.

Federal Europe.

What are the essential clauses that must be preserved in the draft European Constitution to free citizens from the vicious circle in which they are confined by the intergovernmental approach ?  

First, the legislative power of the European and national Parliaments that will reinforce the democratic control over the European executive agencies. Happily, so far efforts to reduce this power have failed.

The second crucial point relates to unanimity voting. In the past, these votes have proven disastrous because they allow the Council to dominate the other European Institutions and special interests the general ones.  In addition to the examples listed above, one cannot avoid citing the case of the milk quotas granted to Italy in order to obtain its support for the proposal regarding fiscal harmonisation (which is, by the way, limiting free circulation of capital). One can also trace the excesses of the Common Agricultural Policy to this voting system, since no Minister could return home having given in to the common interest since his electorat knew that he could have vetoed unfavourable conclusions. The Convention managed to reduce the areas subject to unanimity vote from 81 to 54. Citizens must do whatever they can to avoid that this number is raised again and on the contrary try to have it further reduced.

The third fundamental point relates to the number of Commissioners and the voting system in the Council. The originality of the Convention's proposal lies in the new relationship it establishes among key European organisations with a view to progressively achieve a genuine European democracy. The Commission's insistence on having one Commissionner per country is justified only if it seeks to remain legitimate on its own. As the European executive arm controlled by the European Council and Parliament, national representation is no longer needed. It must on the contrary seek to be and appear the protector of European collective interests. A smaller number of Commissionners will not only raise efficiency but also the President's authority over nominations and hence the Commission's capacity to better protect the collective interests.  

Concerning the vote in the Council, the Convention's proposal is fundamental and tolerates no compromise. Indeed, known federal governments guarantee the democratic balance among federated units by a system combining one organisation where voting is proportionate to the population with another one where voting is on a one unit one vote basis, in order to protect the smaller ones swamped in the first body.  In the Convention's proposal, the first body is the European Parliament, the second one could one day become the European Council which will continue temporarily to exercise both executive and legislative powers. Hence, a voting system based on the principle of one vote per country, even if indirectly qualified by the population represented opens the door to a two-body system that keeps a better balance among small and large countries. This balance is important to citizens of both small and large countries : Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that government of small countries are primarily concerned by the well-being of their population while those of larger ones are more interested in longer term international operations. A balanced power system is a pledge for all citizens to benefit from both « the butter and the canons ». One cannot therefore return to any Nice-type voting system in the Council , not so much because it would give Poland and Spain over-representation, but because it tends to give the Council a legitimacy in itself. It is essential that the Council operates on a one country one vote basis, qualified or not.

Finally, the Convention approved the draft Constitution only as a temporary proposal. It would be astonishing  that this text would from the onset give the European institutions full efficiency. It was elaborated on the basis of an existing situation particularly inefficient and it contains a whole set of original compromises, such as for instance the combination of executive and legislative powers within the Councils, which flies in the face of the fundamental democratic principle of separation of powers. Keeping open the possibility to improve the text is, therefore, important. Strangely, the Convention proposed to submit any modification of the Constitution to the unanimity of the Council and ratification by each Member States. The Convention seems to have neglected the finding that Nice was not only empty in terms of content, but also the demonstration that European integration could not evolve under a unanimity voting system. The result of the European Council of December 2003 confirms this finding. Other arrangements must therefore be devised to facilitate at least some parts of the Constitution on the basis of say two third majority in the Council and in the European Parliament and, for fundamental parts of the Constitution - of the National Parliaments.

Conclusion

The failure of the the IGC of 12 and 13 Decembre 2003, opens a new era in European construction. After the failure of the « Pan-Europa» movement of R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi who sought to regroup the European Nations, it is the turn of the approach of « concrete actions aimed at creating an actual solidarity » dear to Robert Schuman that has just shown its limits. Today, Europe's future is in the hands of its citizens. They may not all be convinced Europeans and successive public enquiries by Eurobarometre even shows them to be on the decline . Nevertheless a majority of 60% of citizens recognize that they are also citizens of Europe; 63% ask for a European Constitution and 74% for a common defence which is unthinkable without a proper European Governement to control this common army. While all public bodies retain little credibility in the public at large, the European institutions retain more than the national ones.  

Hence, democratic principles dictate that the text of the Constitution, as such or corrected to facilitate future changes, be submitted to a popular vote throughout Europe. A majority for a federal solution may not appear in all countries at once. But then in Philadelphia in 1796, a number of States also delayed their entrance into the Union by a few years. However, today, the solution belongs to the people and not to the national governments who are faced with a conflict of interest. This is for Europe the only road toward faster economic development, lower levels of unemployment and the conversion of European serves into citizens enjoying their full sovereignty is at this price. If national governments seek to delve the draft Constitution into oblivion, the boycott of the European elections in 2004 should be contemplated by all democratic parties.  
            Jean-Jacques SCHUL