Lessons drawn from the 2004 European Elections - 25.09.2004

 Part 2 of 5 articles on the Constitution and European elections of 2004
      

What lessons can one draw from the 2004 European elections ? One, participation remains low. The average rate went from 49.8 % to 45.8 % mainly because of an abnormal level of abstention in the new member countries (26.7%) while it remained stable in the older ones (48.9%). In the EU-15, one notes that participation rates rose in those countries that had the lowest participation rates in1999 (UK, NL, Finland). Nothing, however, to boast about, since the additional votes went mainly to euro-sceptic parties. Two, these elections as rightly shown by former EP, Fernand Herman, are pretext-elections : opposition parties gain the upper-hand in countries like France, Germany and Italy, that represent two-thirds of the voting power in the European Parliament. They are a pretext to settle national disputes. In several countries, these elections coincided with other national or regional elections and few were the politicians who discussed European issues. Three, euro-sceptic and extreme-right parties significantly increased their representation in the European Parliament. This represents possibly the single most serious threat on Europe precisely when the European Parliament gains more power. In summary, more than halve of the European citizens threaten European democracy either by abstaining or by voting for extreme nationalist parties.

The main lesson to be drawn from these elections is that European construction is no longer irreversible. C'est la principale leçon à tirer de ces élections : la construction européenne n'est plus irréversible. Before, Europe was easy to sell : for the voters, it represented the solution to problems that national authorities could not solve. This is no longer the case : Europe has disappointed voters. Advantages that citizens expected to reap from the Single Market or the euro have not materialised.  The voters to whom a better future was promised if he accepted to respect the convergence criteria and increased competition, and who sees nothing come forward, naturally looks for alternatives.

The phenomenon is complex and is not limited to Europe. Everyone will find in these developments the confirmation of his own theses. It is still true, however, that Europe has lost credibility. Let us here look at three potential explanations (1)the ambiguous relationship between Europe and national States, (2) the persistent inertia that prevents Europe from delivering its economic welfare, and (3) the difficulties facing any old democracy to gain acceptance of fundamental changes.

The interaction between Europe and the Member States remains ambiguous. Europe was expected to improve the defence of the international interests of European citizens on the world scene where European national governments have limited real power. First, this defence implies a greater distance between the decision-taking centre and the citizen, precisely at a time that he seeks greater direct democracy. European construction was expected to reconcile these two divergent aspirations by a transfer of part of the political power from the national level to the European and regional levels. European decisions, however, remain in the hands of national politicians who give priority to their national interests at the expense of the collective interest. They are the ones announcing the decisions taken at European levels claiming ownership for their successes and blaming Europe for their failures. Even if the national governments are no longer able to guarantee the future of the Europeans in a global world they are the one that hold Europe on the leash through the power reserved to the European Councils. How can the European citizen recognize in this imbroglio the collective issues on which to vote intelligently ?

The too heavy national administrations continue to restrain economic development. Hence, free-circulation of persons, goods and capital  remains more nominal than effective in many sectors. The best example is to be found in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), where federalised monetary policy is a success while social and economic policies that remain in the hands of national governments failed. Nor the Single Market, nor EMU can fully benefit from the promised synergies and economies of scale that were to generate more income and reduce unemployment in order to compensate citizens for their abandonment of the comfort offered, by past national protection.  Without major transfers of competencies from the overwhelming national administrations to the European institutions, accompanied by gains in economic efficiency and overall savings in public charges, Europe will continue to deceive.

After 3 000 years, the European civilisation is running out of steam and cannot escape decadence and disappearance in the absence of profound reforms. « Civilisation is an invariably fatal disease » say the historians. In the past - and the Barroso Commission seems decided to pursue this tradition - it was Europe (1) that carried this long term vision and proposed structural adjustments . Whether it concerned the new technologies (the Lisbon process),  telecommunications, transport, energy, agriculture and fisheries or defence, only Europe as a whole can produce lasting solutions in a growingly global economy. These reforms often imply initial sacrifices to achieve longer term advantages and they are therefore unpopular. As the Financial Times wrote recently about pension scheme reforms : « It is considered electoral suicide to do what everyone knows needs to be done ». Consequently, national politicians hesitate to inform their citizens about these broader challenges, particularly since solutions are out of reach of the organisations they represent.

All this resembles the game of the cat running after its tail. In this game, the voter has lost his sovereignty as he is no longer in a position to determine his future through the democratic process.  At hte European elections, he can only choose among persons primarily preoccupied by national issues while the voter's future depends on the capacity of the elected representatives to weigh on decisions of collective interest at the European level. The disappointment of the European voter translates logically in his abstention or his preference for extreme nationalist parties that challenge the whole process.

The European citizen is sufficiently well-educated to understand these questions and the European Institutions (but economics and culture are still of national competence) or national bodies should engage in an appropriate communication campaign.  It is also urgent for the associations that promote Europe to give priority to inform the public at large about the true challenges and merits of the European proposals. This should be the subject of a new strategy that these associations should develop together.

(1) Except perhaps for the Anglo-Saxon economies.
            Jean-Jacques SCHUL