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7.3.1. What are the sources of information on the political future of the European Union?

After more than a half-century of history, the Union must get down to preparing its future. What measures have been taken and what are the alternatives?

Sites with information on Europe:
www.euractiv.com
www.euobserver.com

Sites with reflection on Europe:
www.notre-europe.eu
www.eurosduvillage.com
www.europe-maintenant.org
www.robert-schuman.eu
www.friendsofeurope.org
www.cafebabel.com
www.confrontations.org
www.ecas.org
www.sauvonsleurope-.org
www.kangaroogroup.org

7.3.2. What is the “Laeken Declaration”?

The Treaty of Nice was signed on the 26th of February 2001 and came into force on the 1st of February 2003. It enabled the Union to carry out the biggest expansion in its history on the1st of May 2004.  However, it, failed in its objective of reforming and simplifying the way in which the European Union (EU) works.

Conscious of these inadequacies, less than a year after the signing of the Treaty of Nice and well before it came into force, The heads of state and prime ministers, at the meeting of the European Council in Laeken at the end of the Belgian presidency of the EU, on the 14th and 15th of December 2001, decided to restart discussions on the development of the EU and on changes to be made to the institutional framework. They then adopted the “Laeken Declaration.

The “Laeken Declaration” commits the EU to becoming more democratic, more transparent and more efficient, and to look at the idea of having a Constitution for the people of Europe.

Specifically, it put a whole series of basic questions about the future of the EU that were to be dealt with by the “European Convention”.

Laeken Declaration:  www.erm.lu/epm/id439.htm

7.3.3. What was the “Convention’s” remit ?

The “Convention on the future of Europe” was charged with the task of preparing a document to serve as a basis for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)* which was to amend the existing treaties.  It was based on the same model as that which, in December 2000 had successfully prepared the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU)”.

The “Convention’s” remit can be summed up by the following questions: What Europe do we want?  Who does what in Europe?  How can the workings of the Union be simplified?  How can efficiency be reconciled with democratic legitimacy in the Union?  What weight does Europe have in the world?  What path can we take towards a European constitution?

The work of the “Convention” began on the 28th of February 2002 and ended on the 10th of July 2003,  after a consensus had been reached on the draft of a European Constitutional Treaty.

7.3.4. In what respect was the “Convention’s” method a novelty?

Firstly, it recognised the failure of the review of the treaties by the IGC* method.  So, no more “committee of wise men”, experts’ reports, etc.  The “Convention” endeavoured to meet the expectations of the public, and to this end it consulted them..

The composition of  the “Convention” reflected this greater openness:  a President (Valery Giscard d’Estaing*)  and two Vice-President’s,  (Giuliano Amato* and Jean-Luc Dehaene*),  15 representatives of the governments of member states and 13 from the governments of countries seeking to join, 30 representatives of the national parliaments of member states and 26 of the parliaments of countries seeking to join, 16 representatives of the European Parliament (EP), 2 representatives of the Commission . There were also 13 observers from the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, as well as from the  European social partners, and finally there was the European mediator.  In all there were 105 members and 102 substitutes.

A presidium of 13 was set up to guide the debate.  The “Convention” met in plenary sessions,  but there were also working groups to consider a series of specific subjects.

Another novelty was that, in a effort to ensure transparency, all sessions of the “Convention”  were open to the public and all the official documents were published, particularly on the internet.

Moreover, the “Convention” held consultations with organisations representing civil society, by means of contact groups and a debating forum. The social partners,  non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academic and economic circles, as well as the “European Convention of Youth”, were able to contribute to the debate on the future of the EU.

Finally, every decision at the Convention was adopted through a consensus.

The Convention Site: european-convention.eu.int

Forum of debate on the Convention:
europea.eu.int/futurum/form_convention

Site of the “Constitutional Convention”: www.constutional-convention.net

About the Youth Convention: register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00205f2.pdf

7.3.5. Was the “Convention on the Future of the Union” “Constituent.”?

The method of the “Convention” was convincing because of its capacity to work transparently, while remaining in contact with at least a part of  civil society. From this point of view it was a novelty and a success.  But that doesn’t make it “constituent”.

In fact, the result of the work of the “Convention” – the draft of a European constitutional treaty – had no legal force of itself,  was put before the European Council and then submitted to an “intergovernmental Conference” (an IGC) .

In other words, the “Convention” did not cut out the IGC.*!  Like any amendment to a treaty, the draft had to be adopted unanimously by a conference of the representatives of the twenty-five member states (the three candidate countries: Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey) also attended the IGC as observers, and had to be ratified by each member State according to its own constitutional rules, that is by parliament and/or through a referendum. It was only after ratification by all the member states, that the final wording would come into force.

So it was nothing like a “constituent assembly”, which, on the basis of a constituent mandate, creates a new political framework and itself fixes the rules for the entry into force of a constitutional document to be brought about through a majority vote of the people, whether qualified or not   

7.3.6. What were the main contributions of the Constitutional Treaty?

The Intergovernmental conference (IGC)* for the purpose of amending the Nice Treaty began on the 4th of October 2003,  with Italy presiding over the European Union (EU).  The draft of a European Constitution, drawn up by the “Convention”  was the starting point for the work, which was concluded on the 17th and 18th of June 2004, under Irish presidency.

The final result of the ICG was the Constitutional Treaty (CT),  which was signed in Rome in October 2004 by all the member states  and, to come into force, must be ratified by each of  the member states.

The CT is made up of four parts. The first defines the EU, its values, its objectives, its field of competence, its decision-making procedures and its institutions: it is the constitutional part.  The second part reiterates the “Charter of Fundamental Rights”, which thus acquires a binding force. The third part describes the policies and actions of the EU, reiterating a lot of the provisions of existing treaties.  The fourth part contains the final provisions, including the procedures for adopting and reviewing the CT.

Among the main contributions and novelties of the CT, we should mention:

• the creation of a post of  President of the European Council, in order to ensure continuity of action;
• the creation of a job of European Minister of Foreign Affairs, so as to make EU action more coherent and give it a higher profile.
• the sharing of the responsibilities between the EU and the member states (sole responsibilities, shared responsibilities and supporting,  coordinating or complementary action)
• the simplification of legislative and executive instruments (from 36 down to 6 types);
• the involvement of the national parliaments in monitoring the principle of  subsidiarity.;
• the introduction of a right of popular initiative, for every initiative supported by at least a million citizens;
• a provision intended to increase the transparency of the work of the Council of Ministers and give access to documents;
• the extension of the realms covered by the qualified majority system and a simplification of the way it is calculated (a double majority, of the member states and of the public);
• the reinforcement of the idea of a common European defence;
• the – absolutely new – possibility of a member State quitting the EU.

So, it’s more of a Treaty than a Constitution!

Nevertheless, compared with the existing treaties, it represents an important step towards a constitutional system.  In fact, it comes across as a more coherent political project  than the previous treaties, and one with which the public should be better able to  identify.

For the complete wording of the Constitutional Treaty:
eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do

For a look at the Constitutional Treaty:
europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/index.en.htm

7.3.7. What are the obstacles to the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty?

It is provided that the Constitutional Treaty will be ratified by each of  the member states according to their own constitutional rules, that’s to say by Parliament and/or a referendum. The CT comes into force only after it has been ratified by all the member countries.  

On the first of January 2007, the situation as regards ratification by nations was as follows: of the twenty-seven member states that made up the European Union at that time,  eighteen ratifications had been completed, there had been two refusals and seven remained to be completed (the UK, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Poland and the Czech Republic).  Putting it another way, 2/3 (some 66%) of the member states making up 56% of the population of the EU have said “yes” to the new treaty.  Nevertheless, the impact of the two “no’s” in the referendums in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005 has been very high, especially since they are two founder members of the EU, and the result is that the ratification process is blocked.

This blockage, which is steadily leading to a state of paralysis in the development of the European structure, is explained, inter alia, by a growth crisis in the EU.

The fact is that, since its origins in 1951, the European Communiy has grown from six members to twenty seven.  But it continues to function with an institutional framework, instruments and rules envisaged for the Europe of the six (particularly the need for unanimous ratification of new treaties).

7.3.8. How can Europe emerge from this constitutional impass?

After the two “no’s” in the referendums in France and the Netherlands, the European Council met in June 2005 to look for a solution. But it is difficult to understand and appraise the many (often contradictory) reasons making for  a “no” vote in the two countries.  The European Council preferred not to take a decision and opened up a “pause for reflection” in the ratification process.     

The “pause for reflection” encouraged the opening of a wide debate on the future of the EU in the member states, aimed at involving the public, civil society, the social partners, the national parliaments and the political parties
 
However, the debate has struggled to get off the ground and, a year after the beginning of the “pause for reflection” ,  the meeting of the European Council in June 2006, under the presidency of Austria, could only take cognisance of this situation and decide to extend this period for reflection.

In fact, it was only with the assumption of the presidency of the EU by Germany in January 2007 that the constitutional process seems to have resurfaced in political discussion.  

Some parties do not wish to reopen debate about the Constitutional Treaty and are asking for the continuation of the ratification process.  Others are pushing for renegotiation of the text, either by proposing a “simplified (or ‘mini’) treaty” (which could involve a separation between the different parts of the text, for instance, constitutional provisions, properly speaking, on the one hand, and the policies of the EU,  on the other), or by proposing a “treaty plus” (by strengthening certain parts of the wording, about  the new environmental challenges, energy,.security or the social dimension, for instance)

Others, again, are concentrating more on the mode and form than the content and propose the conventional method for any amendment to the Constitutional Treaty, except for some very limited retouching, which could be done by means of a short Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The idea of a really European referendum, to be held on the same day in all the countries, has also been mentioned (see, for instance, the campaign of the European Federalists - UEF) and is supported by the philosopher Juergen Habermas*.

In the meantime, the European Institutions have been wondering about the need to strengthen communications with the public of the member states.  The European Parliament (EP) supports the idea of parliamentary sittings which structure the debate more among the elected Europeans and the members of the national parliaments.

As for the European Commission, in October 2005 it launched its “Plan D” – Democracy, Dialogue and Debate – with the aim of deepening the dialogue on the future of Europe with, in particular, the organisations of the civil society (in this context see, for instance, the Speak up Europe project).  With the same idea in mind, in February 2006 it brought out a “White Paper on a European Communications Policy”, a new strategy of communication which stresses the need to listen, communicate and act at a local level better.

Site of the German presidency of the EU:  www.eu2007.de

Site of the Campaign for a European Referendum: www.europeanreferendum.eu

Site of the Speak up Europe project: www.speakupeurope.eu  

Site of the Union of European Federalists (UEF): www.federaleurope.org

7.3.9. What does the “Berlin Declaration” contain?

On the 25th of March 2007, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the heads of state and prime ministers of the twenty-seven member countries of the European Union met in Berlin and approved a solemn declaration.

The “Declaration of Berlin” sets out the common values and ambitions of the Europeans. It also underlines the will of the political decision-makers to bring them about and, to this end, continually to renew the structure of the EU in keeping with the times.  Through its symbolic side, the “Declaration of Berlin” aims to re-launch the process of European integration and move beyond the constitutional impasse.     
:  
Site: www.eu2007.de./en/About_the_EU/Constitutional _Treaty/BerlinerErklaerung.htm

7.3.10. What are the goals of the European Union?

The various ideas and proposals emanating from the debate on the future of Europe, from the Laeken Declaratiion up to the present, pose the question of the goal of the European Union (EU).

European integration has been built bit by bit on the basis of choices made in the light of a vision of Europe and the goal of community action.  However, with twenty-seven members (or even more) the way of managing differences as to the goals of the EU is no longer the same as it was when there were six. There is, on the one side, the idea of making the EU into a large internal market, the bigger and more extensive the better, at the heart of which simple coordination of Community policies would suffice.  Then, on the other side, there is also the ambition of making the EU into a political force, constructed on the federal model, which is in a position to play a decisive and responsible role on the world scene, defending its rights and its patrimony. So, there’s the dilemma: a big-market-Europe or a political Europe?   
 
Between these two conceptions of Europe, there are other models of integration:  “Europe with several speeds”, “variable geometry Europe”,  “hard core”, “Europe of concentric circles”.  All these expressions indicate models of different kinds of integration,  that’s to say alternative ways of organising flexibility at the heart of the European structure.

7.3.11. What is “reinforced cooperation” or “flexibility”

“Reinforced cooperation” responds to the problem of the dilution of the integration process following numerous enlargements which have seen the “Community” club membership grow from six to twenty-seven.

The idea of different rhythms of integration is not new. The mechanism was envisaged by the “Spinelli” project of 1984 and by the first draft Constitution for the European Parliament (EP) of 1994, written by Fernand Herman*.  The Schengen Agreement – integrated into the Treaty of Amsterdam – as well as the single currency, for thirteen member states out of twenty-seven, are examples of it.

The “reinforced cooperation” introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam allows a limited number of member states to pursue the goal of the integration of the European Union (EU) in a specific domain without being held back or blocked by more reluctant partners.

According to the Treaty of Nice, currently in force. eight countries are needed to implement a project of “reinforced cooperation”.   The Constitutional Treaty provides for a minimum participation-threshold of a third of the member states,  or, these days,  nine countries. It has also extended the application of “reinforced cooperation”  to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The idea of “reinforced cooperation” is not incompatible with the process of European integration.

About “reinforced cooperation”:
europa.eu/scadplus/nice_treaty/cooperations_en.htm

7.3.12. What is meant by “A Europe of Nations” or “Big-Market-Europe”?

In a “Europe of Nations”  the latter are the decision-making centre of the Union.  This system, which is like a European confederation, is generally preferred by the larger countries like France and the United Kingdom, and also by certain new member countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic.  It can be likened to the reduction of Europe to a big market.  This formula is the one currently used by some countries like Iceland, Leichenstein, Norway and Switzerland, members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

Compared to the European Union (EU). “The Europe of Nations” represents a backward step, because the countries would be linked only by ties of economic cooperation, denying the community acquis (or patrimony) and sixty years of integration.  This formula puts the accent on the great diversity of economies, origins, traditions and cultures in Europe, and it looks positively upon the entry of new members who wouldn’t be obliged to absorb the whole of the Community patrimony right away.

The partisans of a “Europe of Nations”,  also called  “eurosceptics”, fear the creation of a “super-state”,  which, according to them, would create an extra administration dominating that of the member states  
 
In the opinion of some analysts,  a “Europe of Nations” would come to mean the domination of European affairs by three “super states”: Germany, France and the United Kingdom.  When all is said and done, the approach takes the conception of Europe backwards, to the XIXth Century, which saw a proliferation of European nations, and to the XXth, in the course of which the continent was twice torn apart by wars.

See  EFTA’s site: www.efta.int  

7.3.13. What is federalism?

Federalism is way of grouping political  authorities together so as to increase their solidarity whilst at the same time preserving their separateness. It gathers together democratically a group of independent and heterogeneous states, yet it respects the principle of “subsidiarity”

In federations, the states unite voluntarily, renouncing part of their sovereignty in a specific domain.  This is then transferred to a new federal power.   Generally, we’re talking here of areas of political responsibility: foreign policy, defence, security, monetary policy, for instance. In other domains the state remains completely sovereign   

In democratic federations of countries, a Constitution guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the citizens and the rights maintained by the federated elements defines the institutions of the federal administration:

• A two-chamber (bicameral) legislative: an Assembly representing the people proportionally to the populations of the federated countries (the lower chamber) and a senate (the higher chamber) representing the states equally, with the two chambers legislating jointly; decisions are taken by a majority (simple or greater than that, depending on the case); the adoption or abrogation of certain laws may be made subject to a popular referendum.   

• An executive responsible for administering those matters which come solely within the field of competence of the federal authorities (defence, diplomacy, federal administration, federal budget, federal fiscal matters, external trade, solidarity and home security), proposing federal laws and putting them into effect after they have been approved and adopted by the bicameral legislative.

• A judiciary that ensures the Constitution and the principle of subsidiarity are properly observed:

The most significant examples of  federal systems are:  Germany, the United States of America, Mexico, Brazil, India, Nigeria and Switzerland which, although called the Helvetic Confederation by historic tradition, adopted a federal constitution in 1848;  the federal elements of it are called cantons.

It is possible to name three different types of federalism:  presidential (United States, parliamentary (Germany) and collegial (Switzerland).

In the case of the EU, there is indeed a sharing of sovereignty that has been occurring progressively, but this is being done through the European institutions – whose aim is to defend the common interest – and not through the establishment of a new power or a new state of a federal type!  That’s why the EU is not a “federation”.  Nevertheless, the monetary policy of the member countries of the euro zone is characteristic of a “federal system”.

Sites about federalism:
www.eurofederalism.com
www.forumfed.org
www.federalism.ch       

7.3.14. What is the origin of European federalism?

The movement for a federal Europe was launched in Milan in August 1943 (il Movimento Federalista Europeo)  by an anti-fascist group gathered round Altiero Spinelli*,  as a reaction to the failure of the national political system, origin of the second world war. Today this movement is represented by many associations:  the Union of European Federalists (UEF), the  Young  European Federalists (JEF),  the European Movement, etc.    

The federal approach has been championed by many European personalities of the political world, and also the worlds of culture and philosophy,  starting with Alexis de Tocqueville after his analysis of the American federal system. Whilst the interests of the people may be defended better by local administrations (“the ambition for power leaves room for the love of well-being, a baser but less dangerous passion”).  “this republican spirit then painlessly affects the country as a whole …..  The public spirit of the Union is in itself somehow only a paradigm of provincial patriotism.  …. The Union is free and happy like a small nation, and glorious and strong like a large one”.

More recently, several research institutes and professors, such as, among others,  Yves Meny*, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute of Florence, or Dusan Sidianski*,  of the University of Geneva and of the study and research group Notre Europe created by Jacques Delors*,  have also supported this federal approach.  It has also been championed publicly by President Valery Giscard d’Estaing*, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt*, the ministers Francois Bayrou* and Joschka Fisher*, Romano Prodi,* former President of the Commission and Guy Verhofstadt*, Prime Minister of Belgium.   Jean Monnet* felt that the creation of the ECSC marked “the direction in which the future Europe would have to look for its way towards a federal community”  (see 7.1.2).

The draft Treaty of European Union of Altiero Spinelli  in 1984 (see 7.1.9), proposed a construction of the federal type, as well as the draft Europoean Constitution drawn up by Fernand Herman in 1984.  The Constitutional Treaty of 2004, signed but not yet ratified by all the members would enable us to move towards a federal Europe.

To know more about the movements working for a federal Europe:
www.federaleurope.org
www.euf.be
www.jef-europe.net
www.taurillon.org
www.eurobull.it
www.europeanmovement.org
www.federalunion.org.uk
www.pefa.eu
www.jeunes-europeens.org
www.federalist-debate.org            

7.3.15. What are the advantages of federalism?

Through the principles of subsidiarity and the sharing of responsibilities, It clarifies the links between the various levels of sovereignty and reduces the arbitrary element which too often characterises political decisions. Moreover, even if it does create an additional level of decision-making, the fact that a European government takes charge of matters dealt with by twenty-seven national governments according to often quite different procedures will bring about a reduction in administrative time and costs. We shouldn’t forget that the national governments consume nearly 50% of the European GDP, while the European institutions consume only 1% of it of which nearly a half is in agricultural subsidies.  So, it is hardly surprising that the Federation of Companies of Belgium, for instance, has declared itself in favour of a federal Europe  

The federal model also ensures greater clarity and efficiency in the decision-making process and in the execution of decisions taken.  By dint of proper application of the principle of subsidiarity, it wants to be close and attentive to the public.

The federalists also think that the system favours horizontal links between regional and national partners.  It prevents drifts dangerous to democracy such as the creation of armed forces presented as being European but really controlled by a restricted number of countries. Respect for democratic principles requires that any creation of an armed European force should be preceded by the setting up of a European public authority to control it.

Only the installation of a real, democratically controlled European government would enable the EU to have common financial, economic, social and environmental means and foreign and defence policies. Without the creation of such a government, the future of the Europeans will be determined by foreign powers or by mainly economic and financial interests.

7.3.16. What are the criticisms made of federalism?

The idea of a federal system containing heterogeneous states presupposes more than the definition of common values :  the members must support it zealously. Alex de Tocqueville thought that the American federation would never have seen the light of day if the states had not had as their shared overriding purpose the struggle against the British occupier. Later, unquestioning allegiance to Christianity and convergent economic interests made a set of values that kept the states within the federation.  On the basis of the conflicts characterising the nascent federation the author thinks it highly improbable that independent states will agree to submit without quibble to a higher federal authority.

The European Union Treaties have defined shared values but we don’t know whether these values, as well as increasingly interdependent economic interests, will carry the day over the divergent interests of national governments and over cultural differences.

The low proportion of Europeans who give priority to European citizenship as against national citizenship and the low profile of the existing federalist movements cast a doubt over the popularity of the federal proposal.  On top of this there is the problem of communication:  the term “federal” has different connotations in different countries.  In some it represents decentralisation, while in English-speaking countries it is often synonymous with centralisation.

But – above all – a federal system is not in the immediate interest of the political class of countries, who would see their prerogatives dwindle in international circles, not to mention their scope for discretionary intervention in clear rules and decision-making structures.  Neither do the distrustful attitude of many people towards the politicians of their country and the European administration, and ignorance of European matters encourage them to support the creation of an extra level of decision-making.

Finally, “civilisation is invariably a fatal illness”, historians remind us. Is Europe decadent and irredeemably “under-developing”?  The fratricidal struggles of the last century, the weakening of Europe’s power on the world scene, the persistent unemployment, the ageing of the population, the growing apathy at election-time, the defensive attitude towards the problem of immigration and the vote of foreigners would lead you to think so.  However, the fall of the iron curtain and the successful launch of the euro show that European democracy still has some life left in it and an extraordinary power of attraction.  With the euro and the institution of the European Central Bank,  Europe has proven a new form of voluntary sharing of power,  based on the federal model.  In order to right the course of history the citizens of Europe should undertake to support the political construction of Europe more actively.

“The unity of Europe was never achieved by politicians owing their importance and fortune to their division  ….. ; it was as if the publicity for zip-fasteners was entrusted to button-manufacturers”.
Alexis Curvers*  “Tempo di Roma”, editions Actes Sud, 1957

For a try at putting over the federalist idea, see the article by Florina Neculai.  “A quoi semberait une Europe federale” (“What would a Federal Europe be like?”), translated into several languages:
www.uef.be/uef_v2_ioomla/index.php

7.3.17. What are the advantages and snags of “the Europe of concentric circles”?

“The Europe of concentric circles”, also called “hard core”, is a model of differentiated integration enabling each country to be part of the EU or not, but it wants to avoid a situation where the hesitations of some hold back the integration of the others. The “core” would be composed of those countries which adopt all the European legislation approved, let’s say, by a qualified majority of members.  The others would have contracts of partnership, as observers or of association – while participating in several fields (circles) of integration – but they wouldn’t be able to prevent the countries  of the core  moving forward towards integration.

A new stage of integration would become applicable only if it were adopted by enough countries (two thirds, for instance).  The United States came about thanks to a similar arrangement, since two of the thirteen states that participating in drawing up the Declaration of Philadelphia only joined the federation later.

This approach envisages, for instance, that the countries  that are not members of the EMU within Ecofin don’t vote on matters concerning the euro zone.

This approach would enable political Europe to be moved forward  (and in all the areas where the states are not unanimous), because experience has shown that a lot of countries are not ready to sign up to stronger political integration.  Moreover, it also acknowledges that not all the member states have the same interest in European integration.   The small countries whose trade is more open and depend on the single market, the countries which have been part of the EU since the outset and have a longer tradition of shared sovereignty and those that already have a national federal structure would no doubt wish to move more quickly than the others towards a more integrated Europe.   

This approach is compatible with the initial dispositions of the treaties of Union, which lay down that accession to the EU is open to any European country accepting its fundamental democratic principles  and those of respect for human rights.  It could be the only means of making progress towards a real European policy.

For a definition of the term “Europe of concentric circles”:
europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/concentric_circles.en.htm

For a definition of the term “hard core”:
europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/hard_core.en.htm

7.3.18. What is meant by “Europe a la Carte”?

The idea of “Europe a la Carte” is completely unlike the differentiated formulae for integration, such as “Europe of concentrated circles”,  “Europe at
several speeds”,  “Variable geometry Europe” or “The hard core”, which are compatible with the process of integration.

“Europe a la carte”  means allowing each member state of the EU to adopt only the arrangements that suit it.  It is a “pick and choose” mechanism supported by the anti-Europeans, whereby each member state would be free to choose what pleases it, associating itself with this or that policy. The result would be “non-Europe”!

For a definition of the term “Europe a la Carte”:
europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/europe_a_la_carte.en.htm